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Cockrell: Tort Law

JOINT TORTFEASORS BEWARE:
DOUBLE RECOVERY MAY BE ALLOWED
I.

INTRODUCTION

Consider the following situation: Two doctors are each sued for
wrongful death based on medical malpractice for failing to diagnose a
condition on separate occasions. One doctor settles with the plaintiff before
trial. The second doctor does not settle. Thejury is not informed of the previous
settlement and renders a substantial verdict against the nonsettling defendant.
The trial judge grants the nonsettling defendant's motion for setoff to prevent
the plaintiff from receiving a double recovery. This result is consistent with
principles of setoff and the rule against double recoveries. Generally,
nonsettling defendants are entitled to a reduction in verdicts rendered against
them by the amount for which ajoint tortfeasor settles.' The theory behind this
rule is that, although compensation is one purpose of tort law, victims should
notbe overcompensated.2 If ajury verdict is not offset by a previous settlement
amount, the plaintiff could receive total compensation in excess of the damages
suffered.3 However, the South Carolina Court of Appeals in Hawkins v.
PathologyAssociates,4 recently overturned a trial court's setoff of a settlement
in a Georgia wrongful death lawsuit against a jury verdict in a South Carolina
wrongful death case. 5
This Note considers whether the ruling in Hawkins establishes a
dangerous precedent by not offsetting settlements of prior lawsuits for the same
causes of action despite minor statutory differences. Part II summarizes the
case and the wrongful death statutes involved. Part I analyzes how other
courts have handled this issue, the policies behind the setoffrule, and problems
with the court's analysis in this case. Part IV sets forth potential methods that
can be used to accomplish a result that is fair to both plaintiffs and defendants.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

Facts ofHawkins

In Hawkins the South Carolina Court of Appeals overturned the trial

1. Truesdale v. South Carolina Highway Dep't, 264 S.C. 221,234, 213 S.E.2d 740,

746 (1975) (citing Powers v. Temple, 250 S.C. 149, 155, 156 S.E.2d 759, 761 (1967)).
2. See Hawkins v. Pathology Assocs., 330 S.C. 92, 113,498 S.E.2d 395,406-07 (Ct.
App. 199"8) (quoting Truesdale,264 S.C. at 235, 213 S.E.2d at 746).
3. However, refusal to offset may be appropriate if two separate injuries result. This
would not be deemed as overcompensation.
4. 330 S.C. 92,498 S.E.2d 395 (Ct. App. 1998).
5. Id. at 115, 498 S.E.2d at 407.
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court's setoff of ajury verdict by $550,000 received in settlement of a Georgia
wrongful death suit.6 The case involved the death of a young mother from
cel vical cancer.7 The decedent's husband brought survival and wrongful death
claims in South Carolina against a doctor and the pathology group with whom
he practiced alleging that the physician negligently failed to diagnose
precancerous cervical lesions.' The husband also brought a wrongful death
claim in Georgia under that state's law against a subsequent treating physician,
but the parties settled that claim for $550,000. 9 The South Carolina jury
awarded the plaintiff $3,500,000 in the survival action and $1,100,000 in the
wrongful death action.'0 The trial court granted the defendants' motion for
setoff in the amount of $550,000, the settlement amount in the Georgia case,
against the wrongful death recovery." The court of appeals found that the trial
court abused its discretion when it deducted $550,000 from the $1,100,000
wrongful death award.' 2 The court held that, for setoff to be appropriate, "the
reduction in the judgment must be from a settlement for the same cause of
action.' 3 While the court recognized that "it is almost universally held that
there can be only one satisfaction for an injury or wrong,' 4 the court reasoned
that the Georgia and South Carolina wrongful death statutes do not compensate
a plaintiff for the same elements of damage; therefore, suitsunder both statutes
do not constitute the same cause of action. 5 On this basis, the court found that
death verdict should not have been offset by the
the plaintiffs wrongful
16
Georgia settlement.

6. Id. at 114-15, 498 S.E.2d at 407.
7. Id. at 100-01, 498 S.E.2d at 400.
8. Id. at 98, 498 S.E.2d at 399.
9. Settlement Agreement and Covenant Not to Sue at 4 (No. 2:93-CV-0167-WCO)
.(Nov. 6, 1995) (on file with South CarolinaLaw Review).
10. Hawkins, 330 S.C. at 98, 498 S.E.2d at 399.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 115, 498 S.E.2d at 407. The standard of review is abuse of discretion. Id
at 113, 498 S.E.2d at 406 (quoting Rookard v. Atlanta & Charlotte Air Line Ry., 89 S.C. 371,
376, 71 S.E. 992, 995 (1911)).
13. Id. at 113, 498 S.E.2d at 407 (citing Ward v. Epting, 290 S.C. 547, 560, 351
S.E.2d 867, 874-75 (Ct. App. 1986) (finding that an anesthesiologist was not entitled to setoff
for the settlement of a survival cause of action against a wrongfil death verdict)); see also
Powers v. Temple, 250 S.C. 149, 155, 156 S.E.2d 759, 761 (1967) (stating that "one tort feasor
is entitled to credit for the amount paid by another tort feasor for a covenant not to sue," and that
credit should be applied by the court, not by the jury).
14. Hawkins, 330 S.C. at 113,498 S.E.2d at407 (quoting Truesdale v. South Carolina
Highway Dept., 264 S.C. 221, 235, 213 S.E.2d 740, 746 (1975)).
15. Id. at 113-14, 498 S.E.2d at 407.
16. Id. at 115, 498 S.E.2d at 407.
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The Two Wrongful Death Statutes
1.

Georgia

The Georgia Wrongful Death Act provides that a party may recover
"the full value of the life of the decedent."' 7 Georgia courts have held that the
"'full value of the life of the decedent' consists of two elements, the economic
value of the deceased's normal life expectancy and the intangible element
incapable of exact proof.' 8 Georgia courts emphasize that no set formula exists
for determining the pecuniary element, but lifetime earnings reduced to present
value are a starting point.1 9 In addition, juries may consider the value of the
intangible relationship between decedents and their families.2"
The Georgia wrongful death statute is a "hybrid" of wrongful death
and survival causes of action.2' Like traditional wrongful death statutes,
Georgia allows the decedent's beneficiaries to recover for economic and
intangible losses.' The statute also contains elements of survival causes of
action because damages are measured from the decedent's perspective, and the

17. GA. CODEANN. § 51-4-2(a) (Supp. 1998) ("The surviving spouse or, if there is no
surviving spouse, a child or children, either minor or suijuris, may recover for the homicide of
the spouse or parent the full value of the life of the decedent, as shown by the evidence.").
18. Miller v. Jenkins, 412 S.E.2d 555, 556 (Ga. CL App. 1991).
19. See McQurter v. City of Atlanta, 572 F. Supp. 1401, 1422 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
20. See id.; see also City of Macon v. Smith, 160 S.E.2d 622, 630-31 (Ga. Ct. App.
1968) (finding that the jury is not confined to an "inflexible rule" and that intangible elements
include a mother's unique services which are "invaluable and incapable of exact proof').
21. See C. Frederick Overby & James E. Butler, Jr., What's a Human Life Really
Worth? RecoveringDamagesforDecedents'Non-EconomicLosses in GeorgiaWrongfulDeath
Actions, 7 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 439,443 (1991). The authors explained:
The chief distinction between a traditional
wrongful death statute, modeled on Lord Campbell's
Act and a survival statute, such as Georgia's, is that
the former creates a new cause of action that views
damages from the perspective of the statutorily
named beneficiaries. The latter, however, merely
continues the cause of action the decedent would
have had ifthe death had not occurred; thus, damages
are viewed from the perspective of the decedent. A
survival statute allows compensation for all losses
that would have been compensable if the decedent
had survived the injury....
Although Georgia's wrongful death statute
evolved from Lord Campbell's Act, it is a modified
version. This modified statute is really a "hybrid"
because judicial construction has incorporated
characteristics from both Lord Campbell's Act and
from the pure survival statutes.
Id. at 442-43 (citations omitted).
22. Id. at 446.
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statutory beneficiaries are subject to the same defenses that could have been
asserted against the decedent.' However, Georgia espouses the view that the
"add-up-the-paychecks" method is inadequate to detdrnine the value of life and
to compensate for the entire injury.' Hence, Georgia courts also compensate
for the decedent's intangible losses.
Georgia case law does not clearly define this intangible element. "In
Georgia, the jury appraises these intangibles based upon their experiences and
knowledge of human affairs [and] may also consider the decedent's
relationships, living conditions, and family circumstances."25 Even though
juries are not supposed to award damages for the beneficiaries' grief and
sorrow, the beneficiaries can "testify about the 'society, advice, counsel, and
companionship' that they enjoyed with the decedent." 6 The reason for
allowing such testimony is that the "relationships are reciprocal. 2 7
"Consequently, the statutory beneficiaries and others can testify about their
relationship with the decedent, and 'the jury may determine what intangibles
were lost by the deceased in the destruction ofsuch relationship[s]' by death."2
2.

South Carolina

The South Carolina wrongful death statute29 provides for recovery of

23. Id. at 443-44.
24. Id. at 442.
25. Id. at 447; see also City ofMacon, 160 S.E.2d at 631 (charging the jury that the
value of a mother's life is not limited to the familial services she performed, but also may be
measured by the "facts and circumstances of the family and their living conditions, and from the
jurors' own experience and knowledge of human affairs").
26. Overby & Butler, supra note 21, at 454 (quoting F. ELDRIDGE, GEORGIA
WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONs § 6-7, at 125 (1987)).
27. Id.
28. Id. (quoting ELDRIDGE, supra note 26, § 6-7, at 126).
29. S.C. CODEANN. § 15-51-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976). The statute provides:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by
the wrongful act, neglect or default of another and the
act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had
not ensued, have entitled the party injured to
maintain an action and recoverdamages in respect
thereof the person who would have been liable, if
death had not ensued,shall be liable to an actionfor
damages, notwithstanding the death of the person
injured, although the death shall have been caused
under such circumstances as make the killing in law
a felony. In the event of the death of the wrongdoer,
suchcause of action shall survive against his personal
representative.
Id. (emphasis added). Interestingly, the language of this wrongful death statute is very similar
to a survival statute. See supra note 21. The wrongful death statute allows an action under
circumstances that would have entitled the decedent to file a suit against "the person who would
have been liable, if death had not ensued." S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-51-10.
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the following damages:
(1) pecuniary loss, (2) mental shock and
suffering, (3) wounded feelings, (4) grief
and sorrow, (5) loss of companionship, and
(6) deprivation ofthe use and comfort of the
[decedent's] society, including the loss of
his experience, knowledge, and judgment in
managing the affairs of himself and of his
beneficiaries. 0
As in Georgia, the plaintiff in a case brought under South Carolina's wrongful
death statute can recover for both pecuniary and intangible losses. The South
Carolina Supreme Courthas held thatpecuniary loss is automatically presumed
at death even ifno evidence of pecuniary loss is presented when either a marital
or parental relationship existed between the decedent and the plaintiff."
The South Carolina wrongful death statute is typical of the traditional
wrongful death statutes that measure damages from the beneficiaries'
perspective.32 "Once it has been established the deceased could have
maintained an action for damages, then her statutory beneficiaries are entitled
to bring an action... ."" Similarly, Georgia requires the decedent to have had
a cause of action, which is a personal property right that is inherited by the
beneficiaries.34
3.

Summary and Comparisonof the Statutes

The Georgia wrongful death statute compensates beneficiaries based
on the "full value of the life of the decedent" measured from the decedent's

30. Hawkins v. Pathology Assocs., 330 S.C. 92, 114,498 S.E.2d 395, 407 (quoting
Self v. Goodrich, 300 S.C. 349, 351,387 S.E.2d 713, 714 (Ct. App. 1993)); see Nance v. State
Bd. of Educ., 277 S.C. 64, 65,282 S.E.2d 848, 849 (1981); Smith v. Wells, 258 S.C. 316, 319,
188 S.E.2d 470,471 (1972); Zom v. Crawford, 252 S.C. 127, 137, 165 S.E.2d 640,645 (1969).
31. See Ellison v. Simmons, 238 S.C. 364, 370, 120 S.E.2d 209, 212 (1961).
32. See Nance, 277 S.C. at 65, 282 S.E.2d at 849; Smith, 258 S.C. at 319,188 S.E.2d
at 471.
33. Nance, 277 S.C. at 65, 282 S.E.2d at 849.
34. Vickers v. Vickers, 80 S.E.2d 817, 817 (Ga. 1954). According to the Georgia
Supreme Court,
[tihe fruits of the recovery are not a part of the
decedent's estate ....[T]hey belong to the widow
and the children of the deceased, both minors and
adults[,] ...and they are distributable according to
the law of descents ... as if they were personal
property descending to the widow and children from
the deceased.
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perspective, allowing compensation for the decedent's lifetime earnings
reduced to present value.35 However, "full value" also means that the jury is to
compensate for the intangible loss of the decedent-the loss of the relationship
with the decedent's relatives.36
The South Carolina wrongful death statute encompasses Georgia's
elements and adds more.37 The South Carolina statute allows recovery for
pecuniary loss, grief of the beneficiaries, wounded feelings, mental shock and
suffering, loss of companionship, and deprivation of the decedent's society.38
The South Carolina elements that exceed the Georgia elements are wounded
feelings, mental shock and suffering, and grief of the beneficiaries. The
identical elements between the two statutes are pecuniary loss, loss of
companionship, and deprivation of the decedent's society. The only real
differences between the two statutes are that South Carolina measures the loss
from the beneficiaries'perspective while Georgia measures the loss from the
decedent's perspective, and South Carolina appears to compensate for more
elements than Georgia.

III.

ANALYSIS

A.

The Majority Rule: No Double Recovery Allowed

Most jurisdictions follow the view that when one tortfeasor
in a single
39
action settles, the nonsettling tortfeasor is entitled to setoff.
A payment by any person made in
compensation of a claim for a harm for
which others are liable as tortfeasors
diminishes the claim against the tortfeasors,
at least to the extent of the payment made,
whether or not the person making the
payment is liable to the injured person and
whether or not it is so agreed at the time of
payment or the payment is made before or
after judgment.' °

35. See supraPart Il.B.1.

36. See supraPart II.B.1
37. See supraPart ll.B.2.
38. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
39. See generallyT.J. Oliver, Annotation, Mannerof CreditingOne Tortfeasorwith
Amount Paid by Another for Release or Covenant Not to Sue, 94 A.L.R.2d 355 (1961)
(discussing the rules of setoff betweenjoint tortfeasors).
40. RESTATEmENT(SECOND)oFToRTS § 885(3)(1977);seealso 12 PERSONALINjuRY:
AcTIoNs, DEFENSES, DAMAGEs § 3.03[1], at 73-74 (Louis R. Frumer & Melvin I. Friedman eds.,
1998) ("[A]ny compensation received as consideration for a release of a joint tortfeasor will
operate to reduce pro tanto the amount recoverable from the others.").
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This rule also applies in South Carolina. "A nonsettling defendant is entitled to
a pro tanto reduction of a judgment in the same cause of action."41 Cases
holding that setoff is not allowed usually involve situations where two distinct
causes of action exist and where the settlement specified that a certain sum of
money was for one action and a certain sum for the other.42 In the case at hand,
the Georgia settlement did not specify the elements of damage for which the
plaintiff was being compensated. The Georgia release merely stated that
payment was made "in partial compensation for the full value of the life of
Susan T. Hawkins." 43
Some jurisdictions have addressed issues similar to those presented in
Hawkins. For example, in Dixon v. Ross' the Georgia Court of Appeals
refused to allow a wrongful death suit to be brought in state court when the
widow brought suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) in
federal court, despite the fact that both tortfeasors could not be joined in the
federal action. The court found that although these were different causes of
action, the recoveries under both were similar; therefore, allowing recovery
under both suits would amount to a double recovery.4 The court stated
unequivocally:
There can be only one recovery for
damage by joint tort-feasors... [I]t would
be monstrous to allow a recovery for a
wrongful death under the State statute from
one joint tort-feasor when there has been a
recovery for the same death under the
Federal statute from the other joint tortfeasor."
Likewise, in Brown v. United States47 the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals allowed a setoff of a settlement in a state cause of action against a
federal court judgment rendered against different defendants in medicalmalpractice-wrongful-death actions. InBrownthe plaintiff initially brought suit

41. Vaughn v. City of Anderson, 300 S.C. 55, 61, 386 S.E.2d 297, 301 (Ct. App.
1989) (citing Ward v. Epting, 290 S.C. 547, 560, 351 S.E.2d 867, 875 (Ct. App. 1986)).
42. See generallyVaughn, 300 S.C. at 61, 386 S.E.2d at 301 (refusing to allow setoff
where the settling defendant agreed to pay expert witness fees because thejury does not calculate
expert witness fees in its determination of damages); Ward, 290 S.C. at 559-60, 351 S.E.2d at
874-75 (allowing setoff of $500 against a wrongful death verdict when the settlement
specifically stated that $29,500 was for pain and suffering and only $500 was allocated for
wrongful death).
43. Settlement Agreement, supra note 9, at 4.
44. 94 S.E.2d 86 (Ga. Ct. App. 1956).
45. Id. at 88.
46. Id. (citations omitted).
47. 838 F.2d 1157, 1162 (llth Cir. 1988).
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in federal court for failure to diagnose tongue and throat cancer. 4s Brown then
brought suit in state court against four defendants who were dismissed from the
federal suit due to lack ofjurisdicion.49 Brown died before either suit was tried,
and the complaints were amended to add causes of action under Florida's
wrongful death statute.50 The plaintiff subsequently settled the state suit for
$237,500.' In the federal suit, the district court found that the United States
was entitled to a reduction of the jury's $49,328.50 verdict by the amount of
the settlement due to Florida's adoption of the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act.52 The result was that the plaintiff recovered nothing in the
federal suit.53
The Brown court reasoned that "[t]he fact of the matter is that [the
plaintiff] sought recovery for the same injury-the injury flowing from [the
decedent's] death-in two separate suits, one of which was settled out of
court." 4 The court also found that both suits "requested damages to the full
extent authorized" under Florida's wrongful death statute; therefore, the court
assumed "that the state court settlement and the federal court judgment each
independently comprehended every item of recovery enumerated" under the
wrongful death statute.55 The court stated that the settlement would not have
reduced the judgment if different items of injury were being compensated (for
example, if the judgment compensated the injury to the survivors and the
settlement compensated the injury to the estate). 6
Similarly, inPowerv. AlexandriaPhysiciansGroup 7 a federal district
court held that the failure by separate individuals to diagnose a condition,

48. Id. at 1158.
49. Id. at 1159.

50. Id. at 1159-60.
51. Id. at 1160.
52. Id. at 1158, 1162. The Florida statute provides:
When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to
enforce judgment is given in good faith to one of two
or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or
the same wrongful death ... it reduces the claim
against the others to the extent of any amount
stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the
amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is
the greater....
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.31(5)(a) (West 1997). South Carolina also adopted the Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-50 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998).

The result in Hawkins depended on a narrow interpretation of "the same injury or the same
wrongful death." Hawkins v. Pathology Assocs., 330 S.C. 92, 113,498 S.E.2d 395,407 (Ct. Ap.
1998). If "the same wrongful death" is interpreted to mean more than the same cause ofaction,

then a setoff would have applied under this Act.
53. Brown, 838 F.2d at 1162.

54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id.
Id.
887 F. Supp. 845 (E.D. Va. 1995).
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although involving distinct acts, constituted only one injury." Therefore, a suit
brought under the Federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act (EMTALA) against a hospital, in which the plaintiff recovered $1,000,000,
required dismissal of her state court suit against the doctor and physicians
group that managed the hospital because she had reached the statutory cap for
medical malpractice actions. 59
B.

PolicyReasonsfor Setoff

The goal of tort law is the compensation of plaintiffs and deterrence
of negligent conduct by defendants.' However, plaintiffs are not entitled to
double recovery.6 Setoff is an equitable tool utilized by courts to ensure that
plaintiffs are not overcompensated.
The jurisdiction of the Court to set off

onejudgment against another is equitable in
its nature, and should be exercised so as to
do justice between parties . . . [and is]

addressed to the discretion of the Court-a
discretion which is not arbitrarily or
capriciously exercised, but according to
settled principles. When it would result
inequitably, setoff should be refused.62
While courts recognize that an important aim of tort law is to compensate
plaintiffs, courts apply setoff as a tool to prevent a windfall to plaintiffs, unless

58. Id. at 849-50.
59. Id. at 852-53. South Carolina does not have a statutory cap on medical malpractice
verdicts.
60. See WiLLiAM L. PROssER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 5, at 23 (4th ed.
1971). According to Dean Prosser:
The 'prophylactic' factor of preventing future
harm has been quite important in the field of torts.
The courts are concerned not only with compensation
of the victim, but with admonition of the wrongdoer.
When the decisions ofthe courts become known, and
defendants realize that they may be held liable, there
is of course a strong incentive to prevent the
occurrence of the harm.
Id.
61. See Inman v. Imperial Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 303 S.C. 10, 13,397 S.E.2d 774,
776 (Ct. App. 1990); Harper v. Ethridge, 290 S.C. 112, 121, 348 S.E.2d 374, 379 (Ct App.
1986); Boardman v. Lovett Enters., 283 S.C. 425, 428, 323 S.E.2d 784, 786 (Ct. App. 1984),
rev'don other grounds,287 S.C. 303,338 S.E.2d 323 (1985); Baeza v. Robert E. Lee Chrysler,
Plymouth, Dodge, Inc., 279 S.C. 468, 473, 309 S.E.2d 763, 766 (Ct. App. 1983).
62. Rookard v. Atlanta & Charlotte Air Line Ry., 89 S.C. 371,376, 71 S.E. 992, 995
(1911) (citation omitted).
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unfairness would otherwise result.
Another reason for allowing setoff, particularly in the medical
malpractice area, is the high cost of liability insurance, which results in higher
health care costs to the public. 3 Some states, like Florida, have mandatory
setoff rules for any collateral payments made to a plaintiff in a medical
malpractice case." These states may be reforming their tort law due to rising
liability insurance costs as a result of excessive medical malpractice verdicts.
South Carolina adheres to the collateral source rule and does not offset
collateral source payments. 61
C.

Critiqueof the Hawkins Holding

Despite the policies supporting setoff, the appellate court in Hawkins
overturned the trial court's setoff of the Georgia settlement amount." The rule
in South Carolina, as in most states, is that "[a] tortfeasor who is held liable to
a plaintiff is entitled to a set-off to the extent of all payments made by other
tortfeasors for the same injury."' The Hawkins court's ruling undermines this
fundamental rule of tort law.
First, the court overlooked that, although the two statutes measure
damages from different perspectives (Georgia from that of the decedent and
South Carolina from that of the beneficiaries), the two statutes compensate
essentially the same elements of damage. The trial court recognized that the
"purpose of the Georgia and South Carolina wrongful death Statute[s] is the
right of beneficiaries to recover monetary damages to compensate the

J.T.H.

63. See
JOHNSON, Ou LiBiLmY PREDICAMENT:
PSYCHOLOGICALFLAWSOFTHEAMERICANTORTSYSTM 145-46 (1997).

THE

PRACtrCAL AND

Dr. Johnson argued that

malpractice suits "punish the wrong people-all malpractice premium payers, and ultimately all
patients in the form ofhigher prices." Id. at 145. Medical malpractice premiums rose from sixty
million dollars in 1960 to seven billion dollars in 1988. Id. at 146. "Malpractice premiums
averaged S16,000 per year per doctor in 1988 with some local rates as high as $200,000 ......
Id.; see also Patricia M. Danzon, Malpractice Liability: Is the Grass on the Other Side
Greener?,in TORT LAw AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 176, 178, 180 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991).
Danzon noted that doctors frequently practice "defensive medicine" due to rising malpractice
premiums. Id. at 176, 180. For example, the onslaught of medical malpractice claims in the
1970s resulted in alarming 500% increases in malpractice premiums in some states. Id. at 178.
64. See Pamela Burch Fort et al., Florida'sTort Reform: Response to a Persistent
Problem, 14FLA. ST.U.L.Rnv. 505,517 &n.49 (1986) (noting that mandatory, collateral source
setoff in medical malpractice cases has been constitutionally upheld in Arizona, Florida, Iowa
and Nebraska); James J. Watson, Annotation, Validity and Construction of State Statute
Abrogating CollateralSourceRule as to MedicalMalpracticeActions, 74 A.L.R.4th 32 (1989).
An in-depth discussion of state statutes abrogating the collateral source rule as to medical
malpractice actions is beyond the scope of this Note.
65. See 6 S.C. JuR. Set-off § 22, at 103 (1991).
66. Hawkins v. Pathology Assocs., 330 S.C. 92, 115,498 S.E.2d 395,407 (Ct. App.
1998).
67. S.C. Jun. Set-off § 22, at 103 (1991); see S.C. CODEANN. § 15-38-50 (Law. Coop. Supp. 1998).
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deceased's surviving family members for the loss sustained as a result of the
wrongdoer."6 Georgia law also supports the trial court's conclusion:
"[T]he gist of the [wrongful death] action is
not the injury suffered by the deceased, but
the injury suffered by the beneficiaries,
resulting from the death of the deceased[.]
...The

cause of action, while dependent

upon the fact of an actionable tort against
accruesonly by reason of the
the deceased,
69
death."
This statement comports with South Carolina's view that wrongful death
actions compensate the decedent's beneficiaries.
The trial court in Hawkins also recognized that both statutes contain
an economic or pecuniary element and that both allow "compensation for the
destruction of an intangible relationship."7 The trial court addressed the
similarities between the intangible relationship under the Georgia statute and
the South Carolina statute's recovery for "loss of companionship and loss of
use and comfort of the [decedent's] society, loss of her experiences,
knowledge, and ability to care for children." 7' In addition, the trial court
recognized that Georgia does not allow recovery for the beneficiaries' mental
shock and grief; however, these two elements are simply in addition to
elements that are recoverable under both statutes: pecuniary loss and loss of
society.72
The trial court found that "the money awarded from both statutes is
for the wrongful death [of the plaintiff's decedent]."'73 This statement is very
similar to the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning in Brown v. United States that both
suits attempt to recover for the same injury.7' The same parties stand to benefit
under both statutes. The trial court in Hawkins stated: "The 'fruits of recovery'
under Georgia's wrongful death Statute belong to the surviving spouse and the
children of the deceased. Likewise, the fruits of recovery under the South
death Statute belong to the surviving spouse and children of
Carolina wrongful
' 75
the deceased.

68. Order at 4.
69. Lovett v. Garvin, 208 S.E.2d 838, 839-40 (Ga. 1974) (quoting Thompson v.
Watson, 197 S.E. 774,778 (Ga. 1938) (allowing a husband to recover for the wrongful death of
his wife despite the fact that the wife was injured and died three weeks before their marriage)).
70. Order at 5.
71. Id.

72. See id.
73. Id.
lth Cir. 1988). See supra notes 47-56 and accompanying
74. 838 F.2d 1157, 1162 (1
75. Order at 8-9 (citations omitted).
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Both statutes have a pecuniary element,76 and both states allow expert
testimony to establish the economic value of the decedent's life." Economic
damage is the only tangible element upon which a jury may base its verdict.
Therefore, the economic element is key under both wrongful death statutes. In
the instant case, the plaintiff's expert testified that the economic loss suffered
was $1,146,023.28.78 The jury verdict in the wrongful death cause of action
was $1,100,000.79The South Carolina CourtofAppeals concluded thatbecause
the jury verdict was not itemized, the jury may have based the entire award on
the other elements of damage such as mental shock and grief.8" While this is
theoretically possible, the similarity of the two numbers suggests otherwise.
Possibly, the jury took the figure that the economist suggested and rounded to
the nearest $100,000.
The court of appeals also suggested that setoff should not be granted
because the defendants did not prove that "the jury awarded at least $550,000
[the amount of the Georgia settlement] entirely from the pecuniary loss
suffered."'" The court of appeals did not appear to take into account that some
of the money may have been awarded for the nonpecuniary element. However,
the Georgia settlement agreement did not specify whether the $550,000
awarded was for the pecuniary element or for the intangible element incapable
of exact proof.82 Although the plaintiff argued to the trial court that the
defendants had the burden of requesting special interrogatories for the jury to
break down the verdict, the trial court noted that the plaintiff had drafted the
agreement; special interrogatories would have been to no avail because the
agreement did not specify what elements of damage were compensated.83 The
plaintiff could have drafted the agreement more precisely and eliminated the
dispute as to what items of damage were actually compensated. Under these
circumstances, the plaintiff should bear the risk of having the verdict offset.
The drafting of the settlement agreement in the Georgia case raises
another issue. Even though the Georgia wrongful death statute is really a hybrid
of wrongful death and survival causes of action, setoff should still have applied
because the South Carolina lawsuit also involved a survival action. In Dick v.
Gursoy" an Illinois court offset combined survival and wrongful death verdicts
when the plaintiff drafted a vague settlement agreement that failed to specify
which elements of damage were being compensated.85 The Gursoy court also

76. See supra notes 18-19, 30-31 and accompanying text.
77. See Hawkins v. Pathology Assocs., 330 S.C. 92, 114, 498 S.E.2d 395, 407 (Ct.
App. 1998); Overby & Butler, supra note 21, at 453.
78. Hawkins, 330 S.C. at 114,498 S.E.2d at 407.

79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See Order at 6-7; Settlement Agreement, supra note 9, at 4.
Order at 6-7.
471 N.E.2d 195 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
Id. at 198.
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stated that it would not accept the plaintiff's post hoc explanation of the
settlement for two policy reasons: (1) to protect nonsettling parties' financial
interests and (2) to prevent double recovery.86 The plaintiff in Hawkins could
have drafted the settlement agreement with greater precision, but failed to do
so. Therefore, offsetting the verdict when the trial court had no way of
determining exactly which elements of damage the plaintiff had already
received is fair.
IV.

METHODS FOR ACHIEViNG AFAIR RESULT

Other methods exist to ensure that a victim is properly compensated
without receiving double recovery.
[T]here is also authority for the view that
although the credit may properly be made
by the court where there is no factual
determination to be made by the jury
concerning the release or covenant not to
sue, the credit may also be given under such
circumstances by allowing the jury to
consider the settlement, with instructions to
confine the plaintiff's recovery to the excess
of the plaintiff's damages over the amount
received under the settlement agreement.8 7
The Hawkins court did not allow the jury to consider the previous settlement.
However, allowing the jury to do so may have prevented the dispute over
setoff.
To protect themselves from the result in Hawkins, defendants must
request special verdicts to identify the elements the jury compensated. This
method is perhaps the only way to compare the damages awarded in a jury
verdict with those provided during settlement. On the other hand, plaintiffs will
prefer general verdicts based on the holding in this case.
Allowing the jury to consider the settlement or requiring a special
verdict in this kind of case ensures fairness to both parties. This fairness results
because the plaintiff is fully compensated, and the defendant does not pay a
greater amount of damages than the amount the jury determines.

86. Id. at 199.
87. See Oliver, supra note 39, § 7, at 385.
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CONCLUSION

The Hawkins holding on the setoff issue has the potential of creating
negative incentives on the part of plaintiffs in South Carolina. Future plaintiffs
may file lawsuits against joint tortfeasors in different states or different courts
in order to take advantage of the Hawkins holding.88
In the case at hand, perhaps the sole reason the Georgia defendants
were not in the South Carolina wrongful death suit was that they were located
in Georgia. If the Georgia defendants had resided in South Carolina, they most
likely would have been defendants in the South Carolina suit. The fact that
some defendants were in Georgia was fortuitous for the plaintiff in this case.89
The plaintiff brought two separate suits and recovered two amounts without
any setoff.
Although compensating injured victims and deterring tortfeasors are
worthy goals, double recovery may create over-deterrence or windfalls to
plaintiffs. Courts faced with the situation outlined in this Note must read
between the lines and ascertain whether a plaintiff has already been
compensated for the same injury in a prior settlement. This can be achieved by
looking at the purpose of the statutes and determining who the ultimate
beneficiaries are, as the trial court did in Hawkins.To prevent double recovery,
courts should require that settlements be drafted with precision enumerating
which elements of damage the settlement is compensating. Courts could also
allow the jury to consider the settlement and deduct it from its verdict. On the
other hand, courts could use special verdicts in a case in which a previous
settlement has taken place in order to determine exactly how the jury's award
is allocated. Otherwise, plaintiffs may be allowed to obtain a windfall, and
defendants may pay more than the total damages determined by the jury.
Susan Lyons Cockrell

88. The ability to bring separate lawsuits would all depend on jurisdictional
requirements, which are beyond the scope of this Note. However, due to the expansive reach of
state long-arm statutes, plaintiffs may have incentives to bring suits in separate states if they are
able to obtain personal jurisdiction over a defendant due to that defendant's contacts with these
states.
89. See supranote 88 and accompanying text.
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